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I. The Problem
Philosophers often see Zen Buddhism as a tradition without its own 
ethic. On the subject of Zen ethics, friendly interpreters of Zen have 
been reluctant to propose that there is, could, or should be a distinc­
tive, coherent, and consistent moral standpoint integral to Zen theory 
and practice. There is even more reluctance to suggest that the moral ex­
perience of Zen tradition can generate an ethical system in the 
philosophical sense, that is, minimally, a rationally coherent, consis­
tent, communicable, self-critical, and generally relevant normative 
system.
Less friendly voices have suggested that Zen Buddhism is inherently 
antinomian. It is true that the tradition regularly displays a kind of 
moral iconoclasm. Moral iconoclasm appears vividly in connection 
with the therapeutic search in Zen for spiritual liberation. Zen therapy, 
an aggressive critique of self-enslaving habits of mind, includes moral 
discrimination, * 'picking and choosing,” as one of its targets. Further­
more, when Zen tradition is not expressing therapeutic hostility to the 
ethical mind, it seems to rest in an attitude of indifference toward 
ethical reflection and criticism, thereby seeming to neglect a human do­
main of authentic needs and hard tasks.
That Zen Buddhism lacks, or seems to lack, an ethic does not mean 
that Zen tradition lacks moral content. Ch’an and Zen Buddhism have 
relied for centuries on general Buddhist and Confucian precepts, 
codes, virtues, and exemplars as the content of the moral life before 
and after spiritual liberation. Neither does the claim that Zen Bud­
dhism lacks an ethic imply anything about the moral conduct of Zen 
Buddhists, who have demonstrated moral courage, noble self­
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discipline, and empathic compassion amply in their history. Rather, 
the view that Zen Buddhism is without an ethic is a philosophical view, 
based on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that a philosophically 
sophisticated, self-conscious, and comprehensive ethic is not evident 
yet in Zen tradition. Second, it may also be assumed by some, within 
and without the Zen community, that there cannot or should not be a 
Zen ethic, that the term, “Zen ethic,” would be both comic and con­
tradictory.
It is difficult to argue that the first assumption is false. Zen tradition 
and its more philosophical interpreters, in fact, have shown little in­
terest in developing an ethical domain within the philosophical agenda 
implicit in Zen Buddhism. The energies of the philosophers in recent 
times have been otherwise focused on Zen, especially on questions of 
ontology and existence, with aesthetics a more distant interest. Before 
looking at the separate, second assumption, that there cannot or 
should not be a Zen ethic, it would be useful to inquire why ethics 
receives so little serious attention among philosophers, present and 
past, who interpret Zen Buddhism.
Until recently, the modern, philosophical interpretation of Zen Bud­
dhism has been shaped and accomplished almost entirely by Japanese 
philosophers. That they have not chosen to include a sustained ethical 
reflection in their inquiry may be a consequence of several factors. The 
eminence of German philosophy as the model for philosophizing in 
Japan has probably contributed to a disinterest in ethics, especially 
social ethics. The Japanese intellectual quest for modernity and for a 
modem Japanese nationalism has generated radical and highly 
political shifts of opinion on duty, happiness, and social responsibility, 
as well as a climate sometimes not hospitable to the voices of Zen. For 
some time now in Japan, fundamental ethical possibilities have been 
debated in official and popular media, as well as in intellectual circles. 
To express a “Zen standpoint in ethics” may be viewed as premature 
or futile, at this point in the national search for a sense of what it is to 
be Japanese in the post-modern world.
Perhaps another influence upon its philosophical agenda has been 
the eagerness of Zen’s Western audience for the stimulating and correc­
tive insights of Zen thought in the fields of metaphysics, existential 
psychology, theology, and aesthetics. These Western interests, while 
obviously shaped by the nature of the Japanese Zen resources available 
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to stimulate them, certainly helped, in turn, to drive Japanese choices 
about the philosophical agenda of Zen Buddhism. Finally, it is difficult 
to escape the thought that Japanese philosophers, acting sometimes as 
interpreters with a mission, have evaded the development and presenta­
tion of an ethical standpoint because it is likely to be seen as subversive 
of the official truisms and moral performance of Western societies. It 
needs to be said, however, that Zen Buddhism will have only a margi­
nal influence upon the West if it fails to penetrate Western culture’s 
spiritual style to its living core: the moral heart and will, shaped by 
ethical inquiry.
That Zen Buddhism has not enthusiastically embraced the tasks of 
philosophical ethics is also evident when taking a longer, historical 
view. Deep involvement of Zen institutions and monks in the political 
life of Japan before the Tokugawa period generated little Zen-inspired 
reflection on social philosophy, unless one wishes to count elitist war­
rior codes as philosophical work. Where representatives of Zen involv­
ed themselves in public affairs and wrote about the Zen principles justi­
fying their activity, as with Eisai and Musd, they fail philosophically to 
illuminate the political domain. We are left with the impression that 
Zen Buddhism is, in essence, indifferent to political values. This in­
difference is clear in the case of DOgen, the most philosophical of tradi­
tional Japanese Zen interpreters, who chose to distance himself from 
both religious and secular politics for much of his career. DOgen does 
offer some vital seeds for a possible Zen ethics, but his insights seem 
born from the soil of the life of monastic zazen, not from the needs and 
tasks of everyday life as lived in ethical consciousness.
The weak philosophical advance of Japanese Zen Buddhism into 
ethics is, in part, a consequence of the historical division of intellectual 
labor in Japan between Buddhism and Confucianism, a division in­
herited from Chinese culture. The dominance in Japan of Confucian 
values and Neo-Confucian interpretations in the ethical and political 
realms, a dominance enabled in part by Zen Buddhist scholars and 
teachers acting as bearers of Chinese culture, reached its peak during 
the Tokugawa period. Tokugawa ideological control and subordina­
tion of Buddhism to state purposes provided few opportunities for the 
development of a distinctively Zen Buddhist ethics and politics, to say 
the least. To all appearances, the development of a pragmatic, political­
ly relevant, or interpersonally regulative ethic from the foundations of 
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Zen insight has not been a pressing need in historical Japan. Rather ob­
viously, the philosophical virtues of Confucian ethico-political thought 
have been sufficiently compelling and lively in the past to satisfy those 
requiring sophisticated ethical vision.
Furthermore, we should not neglect the insights of Chinese Neo-Con- 
fucianism on the broader question of the ethical capacity of any form 
of Buddhism. The Neo-Confucians had their doubts about the moral 
desirability and ethical validity of Buddhist thinking, and modem skep­
tics of the possibility of Zen and Buddhist ethics may well consult the 
likes of Chu Hsi (1130-1200) for support. De Bary has summarized for 
us the eleventh-century Neo-Confucian critique of Buddhism:
Where Neo-Confucianism reasserted ethical values, Bud­
dhism was seen as inimical to such values and even a threat to 
civilized life. ... From the Neo-Confucian standpoint ... 
Buddhism undermined human values by stressing their 
relativity, transitoriness, and insubstantiality. Again, where 
Buddhism sought to deliver man from attachment to the 
ephemeral and illusory, to transcend change and the painful 
contingencies of the moral sphere, Neo-Confucianism saw 
change, not as threatening destruction, loss, and disillusion­
ment, but as containing the potentiality for meaningful life, 
growth, and maturation. The latter values in turn were affirm­
ed and sustained by the Neo-Confucians on the basis of de­
fined codes of conduct, bodies of learning, and social institu­
tions conducive to human life. Buddhism, if it did not finally 
deny these values and institutions, at least negated them in the 
process of passing beyond the karmic sphere of intellectual 
and moral involvement. Its essential indifference to human 
relations and social ethics did not preclude tolerance of given 
value systems, or even qualified acceptance of them, but it did 
effectively cut the metaphysical ground out from under any 
positive and final assertion of rational, moral or social im­
peratives.1
1 Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Introduction,” Principle and Practicality: Essays in 
Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning, eds. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene 
Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 7-8.
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Neo-Confucianism appreciated and, in some ways, adopted the 
values and methods of self-cultivation of Ch’an Buddhism, but it 
asserted the importance of moral principles and rational investigation, 
giving parity or even priority to the latter. Contrasting its efforts to the 
Buddhism that had dominated China for a millennium, Neo-Confu- 
cian thought portrayed Buddhism as world-denying and dedicated to 
narrow self-realization, while picturing Neo-Confucianism as properly 
balancing spiritual cultivation with moral action and political service. 
This balance was articulated in the school of Chu Hsi in terms of 
“abiding in reverence” (i.e., detached contemplation akin to Zen 
meditation) and “investigation of things and the plumbing of princi­
ple” (i.e., empirical studies of the changing world and inquiry into per­
sistent values of self, society and cosmos).2
2 Ibid., p. 12.
3 Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom: The Way of Wang Yang-ming (New York: Col­
umbia University Press, 1976).
4 Araki Kengo, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming,*’ The Unfolding 
of Neo-Corfucianism, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975), p. 56.
The later Neo-Confucian, Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), was more 
open to Buddhist insight than Chu Hsi and he saw moral potential in 
the Buddhist life. Yang-ming proposed that the mind in depth moved 
with an innate, spontaneous moral capacity and inclination and did so 
free of the rigidity so disliked by the Ch’an Buddhist masters. For 
Wang Yang-ming, mind, in its true depth, was best discovered and ac­
cepted through “quiet sitting” or meditation, but best expressed in 
moral action, specifically in human relations (in contrast to institu­
tionalized role-behavior, where spontaneous, natural action is more 
difficult.)3
While Neo-Confucian thinkers like Wang Yang-ming were accepting 
Buddhist theories of the self and practices of quiet self-nurturing, some 
Ch’an Buddhist thinkers during the Sung and Ming were reaching 
toward moral and social expressions of enlightenment and doctrine. 
During the Southern Sung, Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089-1163) “established 
the precedent for trying to solve secular problems in the light of Bud­
dhist thought and to overcome difficulties through the mind of 
Ch’an.”4
The Ming Ch’an master Yun-ch’i Chu-hung (1535-1615), in part to 
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counter antinomian excesses within the Ch’an ranks, vigorously 
asserted that “the essence of this mind is neither good nor evil, but its 
function is to practice good and to suppress evil .... the precepts are 
the original ground of the mind of both Buddhas and sentient be­
ings.”5 For Chu-hung, both moral knowledge and moral discipline are 
rooted in the mind itself at its deepest levels, not in the domain of law 
and retribution. So, in contrast to T’ang and Sung masters, Chu-hung 
affirmed that moral ways are inherent to the source and expression of 
enlightenment. Greenblatt attributes this shift in Ch’an interpretation 
to Chu-hung’s belief that Ch’an transcendence of morality had led to a 
denigration of morality by the unenlightened. To neglect moral 
discipline was dangerous to society and self.6
3 Ibid., p. 57.
6 Kristin Yu Greenblatt, “Chu-hung and Lay Buddhism in the Late Ming,” The Un­
folding of Neo-Confucianism, pp. 108-109.
’ Araki, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming,” pp. 59-60.
’ A. D. Brear, “The Nature and Status of Moral Behavior in Zen Buddhist Tradi­
tion,” Philosophy East and West 24 (October 1974): 429-37. Brear’s claim about the 
Chu-hung’s concern was perhaps socially conservative, and con­
trasts with Tzu-po Ta-kuan (1544-1604), who vigorously attacked 
public officials for corruption and hypocrisy. Ta-kuan believed that 
enlightenment experience, revealing the integration and interdepend­
ence of all beings, generated great energy and action. The activity of 
the enlightened, in his view, was working in and on the world, even 
with enlightened “anger,” to cleanse society of selfishness, while 
uniting with the sufferings of others in selfless compassion. After 
challenging the political authority, Ta-kuan was imprisoned, where he 
committed suicide, apparently out of a determination to sacrifice 
himself.7
The thought and examples of Chu-hung and Ta-kuan serve to slow 
any rush to accept the second assumption concerning Zen ethics: that 
there cannot and should not be a Zen ethic. Caution in this matter is 
supported by A. D. Brear, who has attempted to demonstrate that Zen 
tradition has viewed enlightenment as a state requiring moral and in­
tellectual preconditions. Brear claims, however, that the moral actions 
of the enlightened spring spontaneously from Buddha-mind itself, 
without the ethical mediation of reflection, investigation, balancing of 
principles, and choosing.8 This view, that the enlightened Zennist acts 
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morally without reflection, calculation or rules, is found also in 
DOgen’s thought by Douglas Fox. Since the awakened man or woman 
acts from the Absolute within himself, “there is no barrier of self-con­
scious reflection between the stimulus and his response. His acting is 
his being, and he needs no puzzled intermission between the impulse 
and the act.’’9
spontaneous quality and profound source of moral action is found earlier in Nishida 
KitarO. Nishida claimed the “good will** acts directly and automatically from within, 
without dependence on the subject/object dichotomy. See Nishida Kitard, A Study of 
Good, trans. V. H. Viglielmo (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 1960), pp. 136-52. Also, 
see discussion of zazen and morality in Philip Kapleau, Zen Dawn in the West (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1979), pp. 211-15, 227-58.
9 Douglas A. Fox, “Zen and Ethics: DOgen’s Synthesis,” Philosophy East and West 
21 (January 1971): 39. Fox’s interpretation of DOgen’s ethics is corroborated by T. P. 
Kasulis: “No ethical principles or reflective weighing of values come into play. The 
authentication of one’s act is ultimately internal and prereflective.” See his Zen Action 
Zen Person (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1981), p. 103.
Brear, Fox, and others rely upon a distinction between the terms, 
morals and ethics, that needs clarification at this point. By claiming 
that the enlightened act morally, but without calculation or hesitation, 
they seek to differentiate and separate morally responsible and worthy 
action from actions resulting from ethical reflection. The intention is to 
claim that the enlightened act morally, but without the encumbrances 
or “thought-coverings0 of doubt, reflection, or calculation. Ethical 
judgment is viewed negatively as a more or less detached, rational ac­
tivity that neglects the fullness, complexity, and subjectivity of human 
action. Ethical judgment cannot grasp the breadth and depth of ac­
tion, especially action performed by the enlightened master. Ethical 
reflection, therefore, falsifies moral realities.
The truly pure moral action can only arise from selflessness, not 
from ethical rationality. This claim is illustrated with reference to the 
actions of enlightened masters. As enlightened persons, they act from 
deep immersion in Buddha-mind. The Buddha-mind is “beyond good 
and evil,” that is, beyond or prior to discriminating thinking as the 
source of pure action. Yet, the essential quality of Buddha-mind in ac­
tion is compassion, not power, beauty, or the mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans. Therefore, the enlightened, acting “beyond good and evil” 
from the roots of Buddha-mind, always act compassionately. This is 
an interesting, if not compelling or clear ethical and psychological argu­
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ment. And it deserves more skeptical inquiry than it has generated 
within Zen ranks.
This distinction between enlightened, compassionating moral action 
and action dictated by ethical reflection is used to rescue some Ch’an 
and Zen masters from charges of immorality or antinomianism. Ch’an 
and Zen tradition tell of masters killing cats, burning statues, and per­
forming other morally dubious acts. The ethical judgment of these acts 
would measure them against public standards (e.g., of cruelty to ani­
mals) available to the least enlightened worldling.
Perhaps the moral acts of the enlightened, accomplished without 
ethical pause for reflecting, weighing pros and cons, consulting others, 
wrestling with calculations of consequences, and other tossings and tur­
nings, are moral simply because the Buddha-mind is acting through 
them. But, is this true of all their moral acts? Is it possible that some of 
their acts may not flow freely and directly from Buddha-mind, but be 
distorted by ego-clinging and psychic distortions to a degree that the 
acts must be declared unworthy? Of course, they can—and that is why 
ethical judgment has a place here.
Zen interpreters, in accord with Mahayana tradition, have empha­
sized that the quest for spiritual liberation requires by-passing the 
discriminating mind, which obscures the unity of things and, thereby, 
the basis for compassion. Ethics is an eminent expression of the 
discriminating mind. Ethics, therefore, obscures the basis of compas­
sion. Further, ethics is the intellectual foundation of law, politics, 
human relations, and role-identity, all of which are artificial constructs 
obscuring reality and standing in the way of self-knowledge and 
natural, spontaneous compassion. This position on ethics is a 
necessary dialectical corrective to rigid legalisms and the dictatorships 
of the intellectuals.
But even D. T. Suzuki, the clearest modern exponent of this effort to 
evaluate ethics from what might be called “the satori standpoint,’* ex­
pressed the view that the Mahayana was deficient in ethics:
While the Buddha apparently taught a well-balanced practice 
of Sila, Dhyana, and Prajna, his followers became one-sided . .. 
and emphasized the one point at the expense of others. 
Mahayanism in one sense can be said to have gone too far in 
its speculative flight, almost to the point of forgetting its 
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ethical code, the Vinaya, while the Hinayana adherents are 
apt to bring upon themselves the criticism of too much conser­
vatism, and a refusal to adapt themselves to their ever-chang­
ing environment.. .. The problem that faces faithful Bud­
dhists at present is how best to effect a complete reconciliation 
of the moral discipline of Hinayanism with the speculations 
of Mahayanism.10
10 Daisetz T. Suzuki, The A wakening of Zen, ed. Christmas Humphreys (Boulder, 
Colorado: Prajna Press, 1980), pp. 2-4.
“ George Rupp, “The Relationship between Nirvana and Samsara: An Essay on 
the Evolution of Buddhist Ethics,” Philosophy East and West 21 (January 1971): 61- 
63.
George Rupp, in a useful essay on the evolution of Buddhist ethics, 
agrees with Suzuki’s contention that Mahayana and Theravada tradi­
tions contain ethical standpoints which need to be synthesized. 
However, Rupp faults Suzuki for not going beyond the Mahayana no­
tion that the real moral revolution is to change one’s view of the world 
and to accept things as they are (“achieving a new viewpoint in satori”). 
Rupp calls for a Buddhist ethic that points the way to changing oneself 
and the world, not simply one’s subjective viewpoint, in recognition of 
the reality of suffering and moral limitations.11
Rupp proposes that both Mahayana and Theravada thinkers can and 
should continue the evolution of Buddhist ethics, recognizing that the 
Dharma, as the teaching of liberating truth, must take on new aspects 
in order to illuminate a changing world. Rupp claims that the direction 
of historical change is positive, that the world of samsara is developing 
toward ultimate realization, nirvana. This optimism is perhaps a rare 
theme in the Buddhist view of history, but he supports his optimism 
about the evolution of historical being by appealing to the bodhisattva 
ideal of working in samsara to actualize its potential as nirvana. 
Rupp’s view of history needs elaboration: if his optimism about 
change and his concept of history stand the test of Buddhist inquiry, 
they could generate ethical and social forces not often seen in tradi­
tional Buddhism.
Regardless of the fate of Rupp’s evolutionary optimism and hopes in 
connection with Buddhist ethics and social action, his view that the 
Dharma must address changing situations is hard to dispute. He rightly 
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implies that the Dharma must be more active and articulate in the twen­
tieth century than in the past, because:
twentieth-century man is becoming increasingly persuaded 
that he can in fact influence the course of his history not only 
in trivial matters but also on profound and ultimately signifi­
cant issues for which he must assume responsibility. A 
remarkable growth of social and political self-consciousness 
and the correlative awareness of the innovative capacities of 
human technology have become critical dimensions of man’s 
experience.12
12 Ibid., p. 65.
Rupp’s position is that Buddhism as an interpretation of our ex­
perience is not viable in our time if it neglects or refuses to interpret as 
religiously significant our increasing ability to shape personal and cor­
porate life in samsara. Clearly, part of that interpretation should be 
ethical, rational inquiry in the Buddhist community, inquiry in­
vestigating changing human conditions and choices and illumined in 
depth by the light of wisdom and compassion.
A specifically Zen ethic can and should develop as part of a general 
Buddhist evolution in ethical self-consciousness more skillfully and 
vigorously engaged with contemporary moral issues arising from chang­
ing personal and social conditions. While participating in pan-Bud- 
dhist ethical dialogue, Zen ethics can consult its own special tradition 
for confirmed as well as latent ethical insights, offering these insights to 
the communities where Zen finds itself placed in the modern world, 
especially in East Asia and in the Western industrialized world. Addi­
tionally, the search for and testing of Zen ethics should re-vitalize the 
Zen community itself, in thought and practice.
II. Toward a Zen Ethic
Several reasons can be advanced in defense and explanation of 
efforts to develop a modern, philosophical Zen ethic. First, the 
philosophical agenda of Zen has too long avoided ethics. The 
philosophical portrait of Zen is, therefore, incomplete and lop-sided. 
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Without an adequately articulated ethic, a philosophical interpretation 
of Zen lacks comprehensiveness, as well as practical usefulness.
Furthermore, it may be that ethics is one of the keys to unlock the 
mansion of metaphysical idealism in which much Zen interpretation 
seems trapped, perhaps unnecessarily. Forcing the ethical discussion 
may help bring about a creative “dropping of the mind,” casting off 
anachronistic philosophical models and styles, discovering more con­
temporary models and building interpretations from the Groundless 
up. Zen ethics, consequently, can help, on some levels, to energize the 
general philosophical adaptations in Buddhism called for by Luis 
Gdmez:
Philosophical adaptation, as well as doctrinal adaptation, is 
of vital importance in contemporary Buddhism. Philo­
sophical discourse is still an important route to intellectual 
import and respectability. In the West it has been the most 
important road to theological and intellectual integrity since 
the Middle Ages. Established sects must all give a cogent theo­
logical account based on the most contemporary philo­
sophical critique. But not surprisingly, the requirement is for 
contemporary explicability. In this, most exercises in reli­
gious philosophy have come short. By appealing super­
ficially to philosophical forms that hold little or no attrac­
tion for modern Western intelligentsia, Buddhism displays, 
to the Western analyst at least, a certain lack of vitality.13
11 Luis Gdmez, “Expectations and Assertions: Perspectives for Growth and Adapta­
tion in Buddhism/* The Eastern Buddhist 16 (Autumn 1983): 42-43.
14 Robert Bellah, “The Meaning of DOgen Today,” DOgen Studies, ed. William R. 
LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 150-58.
Second, Zen ethics, as a pluralistic process of inquiry into the moral 
consequences of Zen practice, liberation and insight, is increasingly 
needed in Zen groups and communities. As they create and sustain en­
vironments for liberation, in different and evolving cultures, they face 
new opportunities and obstacles that demand ethical clarification, 
debate, and consensus. This is obviously the case in Zen communities 
outside Japan and probably true in modern Japan as well, as Robert 
Bellah insists.14
Third, the development of a modern Zen ethic may be helpful out­
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side Zen communities. Zen Buddhist reflection on personal moral con­
cerns, such as sexuality, equality, intimacy, and careers, can only add 
to the development of a wider, deeper, more sensitive conscience in in­
dividuals and communities. Perhaps Zen ethics will develop to the ex­
tent that someone will catch us off guard by venturing a Zen ethical 
analysis of an option like abortion. Similarly, framing Zen experience 
and insight in ethical terms useful in social inquiry and debate may 
educate and intensify the attention given to issues of exploitation, 
violence, liberation, and justice. Our difficulty in imagining where to 
start a Zen ethical critique of, say, genetic experimentation or Keyne­
sian economics suggests the Zen Buddhist insulation and isolation 
from these kinds of modern issues, as well as the need to find the 
ethical linkages which help people to consider them from a Zen Bud­
dhist perspective. Is it desirable or necessary to maintain a holy, 
monastic silence on these matters?
Finally, making an effort where possible to develop a Zen ethic seems 
appropriate in the light of the Bodhisattva ideal of Mahayana Bud­
dhism. Granted that an ethic can be a prison, a trap, a delusion, and a 
hindrance, yet we should know that an ethic, especially an ethic viewed 
as a process of inquiry and as an exercise of humility, is a skillful 
means, upaya. As a tool of wisdom and compassion, an ethic is 
capable of pointing to special truths, of teasing the ego away from 
greed and fear, and of drawing us into dialogue and community. An 
ethic can be a means for directing wills and institutions to the issues 
and realities of suffering. How can the intellect and energy needed to 
rescue all beings be mobilized without the ethical calculations that 
direct and govern our moral sensitivity? Moral concern without ethical 
inquiry, skill, and even cleverness is likely to be blind and ineffective. 
The Bodhisattva vows, pledged by individuals and, implicitly, by Zen 
communities and their institutions, require steady, skillful, concerted 
efforts to save all beings and to root out defilements. Waiting for 
enlightenment so that one may do these things spontaneously and 
naturally, without effort or purpose or self, has never been the way of 
the Bodhisattva. Meanwhile, individuals and communities will make 
use of whatever ethic lies at hand, be it Confucian, Christian, Marxist, 
or existential. The ethic for Zen Buddhists can, however, be Zen Bud­
dhist.
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A. Some Preliminary Observations
A complete account of Zen ethics will involve descriptive, meta- 
ethical, and normative work. Clearly the bulk of the threefold work 
lies ahead. Odd as it seems, much of this work is simple and obvious, 
but largely unnoticed and untended, to the eye of a Western 
philosopher.
The descriptive task is to develop more complete historical and em­
pirical description of the moral thought and practices of Zen and 
Ch’an Buddhism, through scholarly study of the records and com­
munities of Zen tradition, including Western developments. For exam­
ple, psychological studies of Zen experience have yielded insights, 
theories, and concepts that can be taken up into the moral psychology 
of the Zen life. We need to know, for instance, how and if the opening 
up of a new viewpoint in satori or in zazen empowers or directs compas­
sion, or non-violence, or courage.
Some philosophical work has meta-ethical implications for Zen 
ethics. For example, recent explications of DOgen’s thought may sup­
port thinking through some meta-ethical problems in Zen ethics, as 
well as raise new questions.15 A perennial stumbling block in Zen ethics 
is to make the leap from the standpoint of enlightenment, or nirvana 
“beyond good and evil,” to the existential situation of moral choice, 
of samsara clouded with anxiety and clinging. It is not clear how the 
assertion, nirvana is samsara, can be used to support moral action in a 
lively way, since paradox tends to halt thought and action. Paradox is a 
good starting point for Zen therapy, but probably not for Zen action. 
The linguistic forms in which Zen moral action and principle are de­
scribed and recommended are another meta-ethical focus deserving at­
tention. Should a Zen ethic be communicated directly and discursively, 
or indirectly, through parable, silence, shouts, and koans?
15 See, for instance. Fox, “Zen and Ethics”; Kasulis, Zen Action Zen Person; and 
LaFlcur, ed., Do gen Studies.
A critical meta-ethical question is the question of authority, which 
has conceptual and social dimensions. A Zen ethic is, in part, a guide 
to decision-making and action. By what authority does one decide on a 
particular course of action? If a Zennist chooses a particular career 
because it more closely serves the value of compassion with all beings, 
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why does she choose compassion? What justifies her acting according 
to compassion? Why should she be moral at all? So, the meta-ethical 
question of authority asks us, in an ontological way, to make clear and 
distinct the grounds upon which Zen values rest and from which they 
may logically arise. Further, are those grounds rationally or intuitively 
available? Are they revealed in texts or in the gestures of the enlighten­
ed?
On the other hand, the question of authority is social. Who will 
determine the principles and applications of Zen moral conduct? Shall 
norms arise out of direct, personal experience (what kinds of ex­
perience?)? Shall we be “lamps unto ourselves” in matters of morals? 
Or, shall a teacher or community serve as authority? In what ways, 
why, and where? In the modern period, if authority will rest in the Zen 
community, rather than in a master, a new but critical return to the 
Vinaya texts on consensual monastic discipline will be in order, as well 
as careful study of the moral ecology of differing Zen monastic tradi­
tions and experiments.
Another question concerns the relationship between teacher and stu­
dent in Zen training. Far more is known about the psychological condi­
tions characteristically found in this relationship than about the ethical 
conditions and constraints that might convey some measure of how 
wisdom and compassion are actualized in the encounter. This is an 
especially keen issue in Western Zen, and raising it also raises radical 
and pressing questions about the nature of Dharma transmission and 
religious community, about the expression of compassion and the 
qualities of Zen liberation.
Some might argue that the question of authority is answered already: 
that the ontological source of value and value concepts is Buddha- 
mind, which becomes available to us primarily in the lives, deeds, and 
words of Zen sages, if not in our own direct experience. Does this 
mean, among other things, that the ethical resources of other 
philosophical schools and theological traditions are not useful, much 
less necessary, for Zen ethics? Or, can Zen ethics be enriched and even 
enabled only through consultation with the moral experience and 
ethical thought of Christians, utilitarian philosophers, Marxists, and 
others, as once Ch’an Buddhism was in its encounter with Neo-Confu- 
cianism?
Ethics in its more practical functioning often relies upon specialized 
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disciplines and bodies of learning in the explication of problems, deci­
sion options, and consequences; thus, ethical analysis of a problem of 
justice is best carried on with at least some reference to descriptions of 
the situation as developed by political and economic sciences. The 
meta-ethical question in this regard is, perhaps, how to balance the pro­
blematic “objectivity” of the sciences with the radical “subjectivity” 
of Zen, for these two methods of apprehending a situation will impact 
upon each other in complex ways. Again, in investigating the world, 
should Zen ethics prefer the findings of “systemic” sciences, like 
ecology, and avoid sciences working with mechanistic models of the 
world and of sentient beings?
Morally significant and ethically interesting knowledge of the world 
can emerge also from other sources, including cultural revolutions, 
social movements, and artists. Zen ethics must include methods of in­
terpreting and appropriating all gates to the truth. Zen, for example, 
needs to learn from the experience, suffering, insights and ways of life 
of women, obviously, for women’s experience has been ignored and 
distorted in Zen tradition. The extension of ethical consideration in 
Zen ethics should reach to children and animals, even to rocks, 
perhaps. As Zen ethics addresses questions of nuclear war strategy, 
animal liberation, poverty, and environmental degradation, how shall 
it learn from and integrate the insights of other moral points of view 
and ethical thought? What is the appropriate Zen style for supporting 
and challenging other moral points of view?
Finally, the normative aspect of the work of Zen ethics requires in­
quiry, debate, and testing of specific moral models, principles and 
norms. Moral models and norms can illuminate the moral dimensions 
of experience, awaken and focus moral sensitivity, guide decision-mak­
ing, and help us find a balance among competing principles.
B. The Bodhisattva Model: The Norms of Wisdom and Compassion
A search for normative principles of Zen ethics quickly finds 
proposals that the bodhisattva model offers a powerful, central, and 
traditional resource. The bodhisattva, as understood in Mahayana 
tradition, is the synthesis of wisdom and compassion, of radical self- 
knowledge with dedication to the peace and well-being of all beings. 
Furthermore, by declaring that the everyday world is a Buddha-field, 
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that samsara is the place within which nirvana discloses itself, the 
bodhisattva model validates moral engagement and transforming ac­
tion in everyday life. The Mahayana literature celebrates the depth 
achievement of the bodhisattva in self-transcendence and spiritual 
freedom, while insisting that this self-transcendence opens upon all be­
ings. Because the bodhisattva encounters all beings without self-regard- 
ing desires, fears or delusions, there occurs an effulgence of acts of com­
passion, delivered with appropriate and effective means to the end of 
rescuing, saving, healing all beings.
Zen tradition has more clearly appropriated and expressed the 
wisdom dimension of the bodhisattva model, to the apparent relative 
neglect of the exercise of compassion. A Zen ethics must help revive 
and remake the role of compassion in Zen thought and practice. 
Ultimately, of course, Zen ethics acknowledges that wisdom and com­
passion are ontological categories, their dialectical unity beyond the 
ethical domain. However, the ethical domain must minimally claim 
wisdom and compassion as expedient principles for ethical analysis and 
judgment, as virtues for cultivation, and as clues to moral development 
and expression.
Contemporary discussions of bodhisattva wisdom and compassion 
treat these terms descriptively, rather than prescriptively. That is, 
wisdom and compassion are viewed not as something that a bodhisatt­
va, or anyone else, should do, but what a bodhisattva does, in fact, do. 
It is assumed that wisdom and compassion are states and expressions 
of the being of the bodhisattva. As such they are not seen as principles 
for actions or as duties, but as spontaneous, natural out-flows of the 
bodhisattva nature. The bodhisattva compassionates from a source 
prior to thinking, in a state of No-mind where no distinction appears 
between self and other. The analogy is imperfect, but the bodhisattva’s 
compassionating is like breathing: it happens of itself, effortlessly, in­
voluntarily, peacefully, almost somnambulistically.
The analogy of compassionating to breathing is imperfect because 
breathing, unlike the compassionating described in the Diamond 
Sutra, can be brought under voluntary control, is certainly subject to 
emotional turbulence, and can express not only spontaneous life pro­
cess, but also aware, interactive, thoughtful, willful action, as in 
speech. But, perhaps, an important lesson appears in this analogy. 
There is considerable resistance evident in Zen interpretation to the no­
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tion that the enlightened person compassionates thoughtfully, in a 
calculating way with the usual hesitations. The source of this resistance 
to the idea of deliberative compassionating is the belief that delibera­
tion is a function of “the dualistic mind,” of false consciousness. 
However, Zen is not opposed to thinking, deliberation, and calcula­
tion. It is suspicious of thinking, feeling, and so on when they arise 
from and are tools of the false self, the self-isolating, self-insulating 
ego. The enlightened person thinks (feels, speaks, acts, and so forth) 
from a different perspective, the perspective of the open self.
Furthermore, the notion of the bodhisattva’s moral spontaneity 
overlooks the idea of the bodhisattva vow. A vow is a deliberate act, a 
free, thoughtful designing of the self in the present, for the future. The 
bodhisattva vow is viewed in the early Buddhist literature as a powerful 
commitment, penetrating all karmic levels, and irreversible. Important­
ly, the vow is made before enlightenment is achieved. It is a moral act, 
hardly spontaneous, and a constraint upon natural freedom. The 
prestige, persistence, and acceptance of at least the classic Four 
Bodhisattva Vows in Zen suggests that, among those not yet enlighten­
ed, as well as with the enlightened, it is appropriate to promise to do 
and to be “someone” in the future: one who will save all beings, root 
out defilements, walk all paths to truth, and achieve the awakened, 
open mind and heart of a Buddha.
From the standpoint of Zen ethics, then, the Zen life includes a will 
to cultivate oneself in certain specific ways, and a will to relate oneself 
to others in true and helpful ways. This view of the Zen life and the 
practice that is in harmony with it do not necessarily preclude the Zen 
view that, on the psychological and ontological levels, there is “no self 
to cultivate” and “no others to relate to.” However, from the ethical 
standpoint, “no self to cultivate” does not mean “no cultivation, no 
practice,” but “cultivate no-ego” in one’s choices and habits. Similar­
ly, “no others to relate to” means, in Zen ethics, “do not relate to 
others as ‘others.’ ”
Zen ethics in the bodhisattva model, it may be seen, is two-fold in its 
focus: self-cultivation and helping others, wisdom and compassion. To 
further exploration and clarification of the ethical implications of Zen 
wisdom and Zen compassion, the wisdom focus can be described and 
elaborated by viewing it as the key term of a Zen “ethic of self-realiza­
tion.” The theme of compassion might provisionally be explored as the 
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central principle in a Zen “ethic of mutuality/’ an interpersonal, 
social, inter-species view of the way of compassion. These explorations 
may demonstrate, in a simple, preliminary way, that Zen ethics in­
volve a clear set of virtues to be cultivated, as well as a set of principles 
to regulate interpersonal and social decision-making in particular situa­
tions.
The life of the Zen Buddhist, the way of Zen, is clearly understood 
and talked about in teleological terms, as Nishitani Kciji indicates.16 
The goal of Zen practice is compassionating wisdom or, stated more 
personally, a character directed, cultivated, or unfolded in such a way 
that it is increasingly free of internal hindrances to loving action, and 
courageous enough to express itself in the face of external obstacles to 
loving action. Vigorous, painful, and prolonged efforts to discover and 
nurture the seeds of this character characterize Zen at its best. Paradox­
ically, however, it is believed that the root of this character is already 
present and is from the beginning expressing itself in the very effort to 
discover itself. Zen practice is, then, “Buddha making Buddha.” But, 
most commonly, Zen practice begins not with this awareness, but with 
a desire to be released from suffering, a yearning to function more 
freely, a sense that one has not yet known and manifested one’s whole 
or real self, that there is a goal to be reached.
16 See Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982), pp. 270-85. Also, Robert A. F. Thurman, 
“Guidelines for Buddhist Social Activism based on Nagarjuna’s Jewel Garland of 
Royal Counsels/' The Eastern Buddhist 16 (Spring 1983).
The Zen search for self-realization centers on the practice of sitting 
meditation, zazen, in an appropriate environment. While the search is 
inward and intuitive, it proceeds with the support of an external 
framework of routines, symbolizing ceremonies, and social support, 
the latter focused in the exemplary master who embodies the hope and 
perhaps some features of the form of self-realization. The search in­
ward becomes a vortex, a drawing in and letting go of habits of the ego 
in body, speech, mind and heart. At the same time, a new, fundamen­
tal posture of selfhood emerges, sometimes dramatically.
The new self-posture achieved in Zen is said to be marked by the in­
creasing presence of specific moral qualities, perfections, or virtues, the 
paramitas. These are usually described as psychological dispositions to 
act more generously and patiently with others, to more willingly refrain 
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from the cruder immoral deeds (hostility and lying, as well as killing 
and stealing), to pursue vigorously and heroically one’s moral course, 
to refine further one’s mastery of the paths of inwardness, and, finally, 
to practice (or trustfully rely on) the perfection of wisdom, prajna- 
paramita, a virtue characterized as feminine and maternal, describable 
perhaps as the mysterious source of all virtues, or perhaps as a trans­
moral symbol for the realized self.
The Zen ethic of self-realization, while sometimes described as a 
psycho-spiritual quest for freedom from hindrances to a freely flowing, 
natural selfhood, is also clearly a discipline of virtues of character, in­
volving training in habits of body, speech, and mind. For example, as 
blockages to free self-functioning are removed, the Zennist often under­
takes simple, ritualized daily chores or engages in highly formalized 
and intricate art forms. Clearly these forms are vehicles for and of the 
radical openness and creativity of Emptiness or sunyata. These prac­
tical and aesthetic expressions have their psychological dimensions, but 
they are also, at their best, ethical: they are effective means to cultivate, 
support, and teach the paramitas, in their practitioners and others. The 
arts of Zen, finally, become useful media in that their presence and 
practice support Zen wisdom and compassion and challenge the works 
of selfishness in the wider society.
It is odd that interpreters of Zen have usually neglected to explore 
the ethical dimensions of the Zen arts, how the tea ceremony and 
kyQdO, Japanese archery, for instances, demand, in a limited form, the 
concentration of will, training of body and mind, patience, and trust 
of Zen training itself. It is even more puzzling that what we assume is 
necessary to the practice of an art, namely, study under a teacher, prac­
tice and repetition, and a long contest with oneself to be transformed 
by the art, many assume is not necessary in the practice of an ethical 
form or ideal, at least in a systematic, self-consciously organized way. 
Rather, it is as if we are asked to believe that moral patience, unlike the 
gracefully simple gestures of tea ceremony, is artlessly generated by 
meditation practice, and courage in the face of life and death, unlike 
the releasing of the bowstring, comes naturally or spontaneously to the 
Zen sage. This view assumes the paramitas are spiritual graces given 
with enlightenment, not moral virtues acquired through cultivation.
The virtues of patience, kindness, and energetic zeal are much in 
evidence in the hortatory rhetoric of Zen teachers encouraging layper­
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sons and monks in the moral life. But, only the paramita of meditation 
is systematically and regularly practiced. Why is there not a 
methodology and practice hall for patience, as there is for meditation? 
The literature differentiates meditation from patience, so it is not 
sufficient to note that patience is required in the meditation hall. The 
differentiation of the virtues suggests they are separable in their coming 
to be and expression at some level. Surely, patience lends itself to 
systematic investigation, practice, and development. But apparently it 
has not been viewed this way.
The more clearly interpersonal virtues of the bodhisattva have not 
been emphasized to the degree that meditation has in interpretations of 
the Zen life. This lack of emphasis or even attention is due, perhaps, to 
the view that the virtues of patience, vigor, morality, and generosity 
are not virtues at all, subject to deliberate cultivation, but graces, 
spiritual by-products or gifts of the psycho-spiritual states developed in 
meditation or flowing from Buddha-mind.
The moral paramitas have not been the focus of Zen life for another 
reason: Zen tradition’s long-standing suspicion of moral effort. Zen 
masters are persistent in declaring that hard work will not produce 
enlightenment or spiritual freedom, at the same time they prod their 
students to maximum efforts in meditation. Doing meditation vigorous­
ly or performing the other virtuous acts will not make you a Buddha. 
To believe it will is like believing you can make a mirror by polishing a 
brick with great vigor.
The paradox of cultivating self-realization (by seeking it one loses it) 
seems to be doubly true of the moral virtues. A key parable of Ch’an 
and Zen speaks to this. Bodhidharma, the fountainhead of Ch’an Bud­
dhism, was asked by the Emperor, “How much merit have I gained by 
my generous endowment of monasteries and temples?” Bodhidharma 
replied, “No merit.” This has been interpreted to mean that no collec­
tion of good works will add up to spiritual freedom and release from 
suffering. Bodhidharma is declaring that the goal of Buddhism 
transcends a moral calculus and concerns for one’s own salvation. But 
this exegesis of “No merit” can lead to moral indifference and slop­
piness in Ch’an and Zen.
Bodhidharma’s “No merit” is an invitation to consider in depth the 
role of the moral act in Zen self-realization. “No merit” may be more 
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like a koan than a direct reply to the Emperor’s request for a moral 
measurement. Perhaps “No merit” means that the only authentic 
generosity is selfless giving that flows from the enlightened self. Or, 
perhaps Bodhidharma is refusing to serve as an external authority for 
the Emperor. Perhaps his “No merit” is an utterance from the dissolv­
ing ground of Buddha-mind, where the relativity of all acts is disclosed 
in sunyata. But is it clear that “No merit” reveals the futility of ego­
wrapped giving or permits moral passivity?
Is it self-evident, from a Zen point of view, that a moral act or a 
character disposed by self-cultivation to moral action cannot point to 
and bring about a profound self-realization? Even granting that the 
paramitas flow as graces from Buddha-mind, is the reverse movement 
impossible: that the practice of the Buddhist virtues leads to and im­
bues one’s efforts with wisdom and compassion? Can we speak of a 
moral satori, as we speak assuredly of insights and enlightenment, 
however partial and small, in the practice of the arts?
Imagine a Zen master of the moral arts, whose special path is the 
search for compassion through the practice of kind words. He teaches 
a discipline that begins with learning to speak kind words in all situa­
tions to different people. The discipline deepens as students train in 
listening and observing the recipients of kind words, and it extends to 
awareness of how the body and mind can be integrated into the expres­
sion of kindness. Imagine, further, that years of practice in the art of 
kind words lead to a kind of selfless opennness to every recipient, a fine 
tuning to human need, an upaya-like selection of words, tone, volume, 
rhythm, hand position and body posture, and the delivery of the heal­
ing gift of kind speech. Of course, the master might heal with the gift 
of silence or with a “Kwatz!”, but surely he would have a wide reper­
toire of means to the end of expressing bodhisattvic kindness in speech.
It would be difficult to claim that this “Zen of kind words” was less 
difficult or less worthy than other paths, such as swordsmanship. In­
deed, it might have more merit. Further, it should not be difficult to 
conceive the possibility of satori openings and development in such a 
practice.
Bodhidharma’s “No merit,” therefore, can be imagined as arising 
not only from Buddha-mind, but also as made possible through cultiva­
tion of a language, a form of mutuality among all beings that is 
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sometimes expedient to use, notwithstanding communication “without 
benefit of words and letters.” That is, “No merit” does not entail “No 
cultivation of moral acts.”
“No merit” may also even permit us to think of a Zen “ethics of 
mutuality” centered in principles, guided by reason and logic, enriched 
by empirical investigations, and decided by communities. The Emperor 
has asked Bodhidharma if his generous gifts for the construction of 
monasteries and temples are good, of benefit to monks and Emperor, 
Sangha and Empire. Perhaps “No merit” is the conclusion of an in­
vestigation into the costs and benefits of all this construction activity? 
“No merit” may mean that the pacification of society achieved 
through the construction of hundreds of religious establishments is a 
good balanced by harm to wildlife and watersheds resulting from the 
deforestation accompanying the harvesting of too many trees for 
temples. That Bodhidharma may have used a utilitarian calculus 
before Bentham invented it is not what is odd about this imaginary pro­
posal that Bodhidharma is a brave ecologist. What seems odd is 
Bodhidharma’s calculating the balance of benefits and harms in the 
light of public knowledge. Is the idea of Bodhidharma calculating en­
vironmental costs of massive social-political construction projects in­
compatible with the revered image of Bodhidharma contemplating the 
wall?
A Zen “ethics of mutuality,” defined as “interpersonal and social 
ethics conducted in the light of the Buddhist principle of compassion,” 
and implying the use of reason and empirical investigation, is needed in 
the unfinished philosophical domain of Zen ethics.17 Several 
philosophical voices within Zen have called for a socially relevant 
moral expression of Zen.18 Few have seen this as requiring or legitimiz­
17 Thurman discusses principles for Buddhist socio-political ethics found in Nagar- 
juna and applies them eloquently, if sketchily, to some modern issues, in his 
“Guidelines for Buddhist Social Activism.” Also see the homiletical meditations of 
Robert Aitken, The Mind of Clover: Essays in Zen Buddhist Ethics (Berkeley: North 
Point Press, 1984).
18 See Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, pp. 218-85. Also, Abe Masao in Zen 
and Western Thought, cd. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985), p. 248, and in “The Oneness of Practice and Attainment: Implications for the 
Relation of Means and Ends,” DOgen Studies, pp. 109-11. Also, Francis Cook, 
“DOgen’s View of Authentic Selfhood,” DOgen Studies, 142-48. And, Gdmez, “Expec­
tations and Assertions,” pp. 44-46.
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ing some use of the tools of social ethics, namely, psychological and 
social sciences, empirical methodology, reason, expertise, and so on, as 
skillful means to the end of a compassionating society. But, as G6mez 
has suggested, to release Buddhism for this and other new tasks 
demands at least a critique of tradition: “one must kill the Buddha, 
and kill the Patriarchs of the Zen tradition.”19
19 Gdmez, “Expectations and Assertions,” p. 4!.
III. Conclusions
Whatever normative principles emerge, in old and new shapes, from 
Zen ethical inquiry and construction, they should appear in forms that 
meet a double demand. On the one hand, Zen principles for the work 
of ethics must be carved, to some degree, to fit the language forms of 
ethical discourse as conducted by philosophers and others. This de­
mand would tend to curtail the use of parable, Zen story, koan, 
shouts, or silence in response to questions of ethical justification, calls 
for clarity of definition, charges of mystic fogginess, or accusations of 
nonsense. These have their role, but not in most ethical discourse. Cer­
tainly, Zen ethical principles can be subjected to the same critique and 
standards of ethics as other teachings are: clarity, coherence, consisten­
cy, universalizability, and satisfaction?
The second demand, ironically, is not to abandon the indirection in 
ethical communication made possible by parable, story, and other 
characteristically Zen forms of expression. The search for clear, 
distinct, testable, and shareable principles and strategies in Zen ethics 
must be carried much further than it has been. Yet, the conceptual 
forms in which the ethical truth of Zen is focused, and the lives in 
which it is embodied, should be as transparent to Emptiness, sunyata, 
as possible. Emptiness, or creative openness to the heart of all beings, 
needs the forms of ethical principles, and ethical principles are op­
pressive without creative openness. The way in which Zen principles 
are formed, used, and lived will result in greater or lesser openness, 
lightness, and freedom among those teaching, learning, and hearing 
them.
Zen ethics should be conducted with a spirit of lightness. 
“Lightness” means here a deft, tentative handling of cases and prin­
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ciples, and an avoidance of clinging in self-defense to principles. 
Lightness is necessary for two related reasons. First, all thinking, in­
cluding Zen-focused philosophical thinking, is subject to Zen’s sense 
of the transcendent, namely, that truth cannot be wholly captured in 
the form of thought. In the face of this transcendent dimension of 
truth, the thinker practices humility. Second, the same sense of the 
transcendent evokes humor, the lightening recognition that Zen ethics 
is always incomplete and may be playful.
The lightness of Zen ethics will permit its forms, its principles and 
rules, to unfold in an open and creative fashion. By enhancing open­
ness and creativity in the doing of ethics, it is possible also to promote 
the ethical capability so critical to Zen: a Zen principle of action should 
be existentially appropriated by a human being in such a way as to 
preserve the freedom and responsibility of the person making the ap­
propriation, for the appropriation of a principle can be a freeing or an 
enslaving affair. A Zen principle appropriated to oneself in a spirit of 
clinging is not a Zen principle. A Christian principle appropriated to 
oneself in the mode of self-loosing, awakened, compassionating, 
creative openness is a Zen principle. It is a matter of more than content 
(e.g., a set of Zen ethical principles), for Zen ethics must be conducted 
and lived existentially, in a passionate inwardness so profound that it 
opens into the hearts of all being.20
20 My concern here is inspired by my reading of Kierkegaard, especially in his theory 
of ‘‘indirect communication”; see my ‘‘The Indirect Communication: Kierkegaard 
and Beckett,” Art and Religion as Communication, eds. James Waddell and F. W. 
Dillistone (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974). Nolan Pliny Jacobson finds Kierkegaard 
in parallel with Buddhism on somewhat the same point, in his Understanding Bud­
dhism (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), pp. 91-98.
While lightness, humility, humor, creativity, openness, and indirec­
tion are affirmed as signature qualities of Zen ethics at its best, it is still 
necessary to articulate a path or system for the doing of Zen ethics. 
Viewed as a conceptual and normative system, Zen ethics will encom­
pass general principles, pre-eminently wisdom and compassion. Other 
principles will include the paramitas of generosity, patience, self- 
mastery, and so on, as well as norms of tolerance, respect for all life 
forms, and non-violence.
The normative system might usefully include a matrix of heuristic 
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rules that assist in generating creative and complete applications of 
general principles in relation to particular cases. Heuristic rules are not 
moral rules detailing behavior. Rather they are aids to thinking that 
assist discovery, generate complexity, and text completeness as general 
principles are brought into relation to actual cases and experience.
For example, in systematically thinking about the “good” of 
wisdom or awakening as an everyday goal, it is useful to make wisdom 
a richer concept by placing it along a traditional Buddhist psycho­
logical axis: that the person is “body, speech, and heart-mind.” Thus, 
the goal of wisdom is viewed as possessing bodily and linguistic-social 
forms, as well as inward references. If we add to this axis the heuristic 
rule that the awakening of the individual implies the simultaneous 
awakening of all things (following DOgen), then a complex, creative, 
practical, systematic, and critical matrix emerges. In this matrix one 
sees that my awakening body involves the awakening of the world’s 
body: a few more steps leads to the conclusion that the principle of 
awakening entails, logically and ethically, the protection and freedom 
of animals, trees, and ecosystems. Buddhist thought is rich in material 
from which these heuristic rules will be formed.
While Zen ethics is a normative system, generating light conceptual 
forms for decision-making in personal, social, and planetary affairs, 
Zen ethics is also a path, a deeply personal and moral way of life sup­
porting and supported by ethical reflection. Especially as the Zen en­
counter with world civilization extends and deepens, Zen’s practi­
tioners and interpreters will be estimating the worthiness of the Zen life 
in ethical terms, and will be called upon to explain themselves. The 
habits they cultivate, the disciplines they develop, the witness they 
make, the communities they grow—all should speak clearly and 
helpfully of wisdom and compassion. Some of Zen’s speaking can only 
be done through a Zen ethic.
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